A selection of my papers, arranged according to topics and sub-fields, can be found below:
The Role of Valence in Consciousness and Perception
Jacobson, H. (Forthcoming). On the Very Idea of Valenced Perception, Journal of Philosophy.
Jacobson, H. (2021). The Role of Valence in Perception: An ARTistic Treatment, Philosophical Review.
Manuscript on The Essential Link between Consciousness and Affectivity (under review, available upon request).
Empirical Manuscript arguing for Intrinsically Valenced Perception (under review, available upon request).
Manuscript on Consciousness and the Evaluable Life (available upon request).
Pain
Jacobson, H. (2019). Not Only a Messenger: Towards an Attitudinal-Representational Theory of Pain, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Jacobson, H. (2019). Pain and Mere Tastes, In. Bain, D., Brady, M., & Corns, J. (eds.). Philosophy of Suffering: Metaphysics, Value, and Normativity. Routledge.
Jacobson H. (2017). Pain and Cognitive Penetrability, In Corns J. (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge.
Jacobson H. (2013). Killing the Messenger: Representationalism and the painfulness of pain, Philosophical Quarterly.
Consciousness and Perception
Usher, M., Negro, N., Jacobson, H., & Tsuchiya, N. (2023). When Philosophical Nuance Matters: Safeguarding Consciousness Research from Restrictive Assumptions. Frontiers in Psychology 14.
Weksler, A., Jacobson, H ., & Bronfman, Z. Z. (2021). The Transparency of Experience and the Neuroscience of Attention, Synthese.
Bronfman, Z. Z., Jacobson, H., (Joint PI) & Usher, M. (2019). Impoverished or Rich Consciousness Outside Attentional Focus: Recent Data Tip the Balance for Overflow, Mind & Language.
Usher, M., Bronfman, Z. Z., Talmor, S., Jacobson, H., & Eitam, B. (2018). Consciousness Without Report: Insights from Summary Statistics and Inattention ‘Blindness’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 373(1755).
Jacobson H., Putnam H. (2016). Against Perceptual Conceptualism, International Journal of Philosophical Studies.
Jacobson H. (2015). Phenomenal Consciousness, Representational Content and Cognitive Access: A Missing link Between Two Debates, Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, 14 (4)
Bronfman Zohar Z, Brezis N, Jacobson H, Usher M. (2014). We See More Than We Can Report: ‘Cost Free’ Color Phenomenality Outside Focal Attention, Psychological Science, 25.
Jacobson H, Putnam H. (2014). The Needlessness of Adverbialism, Attributeism, and its Compatibility with Cognitive Science, Philosophia.
Jacobson-Horowitz H. (2008). The Scientific Untraceability of Phenomenal Consciousness, Philosophia.
Horowitz A., Jacobson-Horowitz H. (2005). The Knowledge Argument and Higher-Order Properties, Ratio, 18.
Practical-Reasons, Desires and Evaluative beliefs, and Normativity
Jacobson-Horowitz H. (2006). Motivational Cognitivism and the Argument from Direction of Fit, Philosophical Studies, 127.
Jacobson-Horowitz H. (2010). Normativity without Reflectivity: on the Beliefs and Desires of Non-Reflective Creatures, Philosophical Psychology.
Jacobson, H. (2016). Against strong cognitivism: An argument from the particularity of love, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 92 (3).
Jacobson H. (2015). Against Strong Cognitivism: An Argument from Caring, Dialogue, 54(1).
Philosophy of Language
Jacobson-Horowitz H. (2008). Semantic Innateness, Analysis and Metaphysics, 7.
Jacobson-Horowitz H. (2009). From Causality to Rigidity, Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations, 8.
Jacobson-Horowitz H. (2005). Disquotation and Proper Names: Brandom on Kripke's Puzzle, Logique et Analyse, 48.
Jacobson-Horowitz H. (2004). Syntax, Semantics, and Intentional Aspects, Philosophical Papers, 33.