Classes

Awareness and Perception | 6172

Semester: 
2nd semester
Offered: 
2024
Syllabus

We will discuss current questions in philosophy of mind regarding phenomenal consciousness, perceptual experiences and the relations between perception and cognition. Some of the discussions will illustrate the interface between philosophy and the relevant sciences (notably, cognitive neuroscience). Among the topics to be discussed: the Explanatory Gap argument and the Hard Problem of Consciousness; Theories of Consciousness (and their relations to philosophical theories regarding the nature of mental states); methodological challenges facing empirical investigation of phenomenal consciousness; 'traditional' philosophical concerns that should be informed by empirical data.

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Among the questions to be discussed:

  • Phenomenal consciousness is widely taken to pose *special* theoretical challenges (especially for the cognitive sciences). Why?
  • Can there be conscious states about which the subject does not – and in an important sense cannot – know?
  • Is our visual world as rich as it seems to be, or is it that we suffer from a systematic illusion regarding the very nature of our experiences?
  • What are the relations between phenomenal character and representational content? To what extent are my basic experiences similar to those of other subjects?
  • Is it possible to infer from theories about human consciousness sound conclusions regarding the consciousness of systems that are radically different from humans in their "hardware" (e.g., AI systems)?
  • Can our perceptual experiences be 'directly' influenced by our thoughts, expectations, desires and emotions?
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Introduction to Philosophy of Mind | 15034

Semester: 
1st semester
Offered: 
2023
Syllabus

We shall begin by introducing different kinds of mental states, and by clarifying some of the central and prima facie unique features of the mental. We shall then present the mind-body problem, and discuss central theories regarding the nature of mental states and their ontological status: dualism, behaviorism, the identity-theory, functionalism and the computer model of the mind. We shall also discuss following issues, which stand at the core of current discussions in philosophy of mind: consciousness, mental content and mental causation.

On Pain | 15998

Semester: 
1st semester
Offered: 
2023
Syllabus

Pains form a paradigmatic example of phenomenally conscious states, and they, as well as other experiential states with valenced "negative" or "positive" characters, possess a special significance in our mental life.

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The last decade has seen an upsurge of interest in the phenomenon of pain, and in particular in the following questions: What constitutes the mental state of pain? Why do pains feel the way they do, and in particular why do they "feel bad"? Do pains, like "regular perceptual experiences" possess intentional contents and represent items that are external to themselves? And if so, what do they represent? More generally, what are the relations between pains and "regular perceptual experiences"? Pains are intimately related to actions – how do they motivate us to, and provide us with reasons for, actions? What is the relation between pain and suffering, and is it possible to feel pain and yet not suffer? Is it possible to feel pain and be utterly apathetic toward it? Such questions will be at the focus of our discussion.

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Perceptual Experience and Valence | 15902

Semester: 
2nd semester
Offered: 
2022
Syllabus

Consider the following experiences: an intense sharp pain in the shoulder, a gustatory experience of a good beer and a visual experience of a spider. The way it is like to feel the pain is bad (it involves an "affectivepositive/negative value" - "valence"), and there is a sense in which the pain itself is bad. But what about the gustatory and visual experiences? According to a hypothesis recently raised in the philosophical and scientific literature, the sensory world *as a whole* is a ‘hot’ world, involving both engaging and repellent aspects. Perceptual experiences in all sense-modalities are inherently valenced: they involve an affective dimension that evaluates and "colors" the objects and properties given to us in perception. For example, a subject may *see*(literally – in a visual sense) something or someone positively or negatively.

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Among the issues we will discuss: What is perceptual valence? Is the Valenced Hypothesis empirically and philosophically plausible? What is the role of valence in perception in particular and in our mental life more generally? For example, does valence play a role in decision making and in moving us to action? How is valence related to suffering and various kinds of pleasure? What theories have been proposed regarding the affective dimension of experiences? Specifically, is the representational theory, which is accepted as the most probable theory of the sensory dimension of experiences, an appropriate theory regarding their affective dimension? What are the implications of the Valenced Hypothesis to the value and significance of consciousness?

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