Pains form a paradigmatic example of phenomenally conscious states, and they, as well as other experiential states with valenced "negative" or "positive" characters, possess a special significance in our mental life. The last decade has seen an upsurge of interest in the phenomenon of pain, and in particular in the following questions: What constitutes the mental state of pain? Why do pains feel the way they do, and in particular why do they "feel bad"? Do pains, like "regular perceptual experiences" possess intentional contents and represent items that are external to themselves? And if so, what do they represent? More generally, what are the relations between pains and "regular perceptual experiences"? Pains are intimately related to actions – how do they motivate us to, and provide us with reasons for, actions? What is the relation between pain and suffering, and is it possible to feel pain and yet not suffer? Is it possible to feel pain and be utterly apathetic toward it? Such questions will be at the focus of our discussion.